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Article 6

Baker: The Shrinking Role of the Jury in Constitutional Litigation

THE SHRINKING ROLE OF THE JURY IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION
JOHN

M.

BAKERt

INTRODUCTION

The civil jury is an institution which is guaranteed by the
Constitution,' but which is distrusted when given the task of
deciding constitutional cases. Much of this distrust results
from a fundamental incompatibility between the functions of
constitutional rights and juries. Constitutional rights generally
serve countermajoritarian functions, including the protection
of political minorities from certain oppressive tendencies and
prejudices of popularly elected governments. 2 The jury, by
contrast, is accepted and sometimes defended as a means of
injecting populist norms and standards into the legal process.3
This tension makes it especially important to examine the
control which courts exercise over juries in constitutional
cases. This control may be exercised as judges withhold cases
or issues from the jury prior to trial,4 as courts frame the questions left to juries in jury instructions, 5 and as courts review a
t John M. Baker is an attorney at Popham, Haik, Schnobrich and Kaufman,
Ltd., a law firm in Minneapolis. B.A., University of Iowa, 1983; J.D., University of
Michigan, 1986.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and
no fact tried by jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United
States, than according to the rules of the common law."). The United States
Supreme Court has refused to incorporate this provision into the fourteenth amendment due process clause and thereby make it applicable to the states. See Walker v.
Sanvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1896). A section 1983 action seeking damages is considered a
"suit at common law" within the meaning of this amendment. See, e.g., Drone v.
Hutto, 565 F.2d 543, 544 (8th Cir. 1977).
2. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (1962); Choper, The
Supreme Court and the PoliticalBranches: Democratic Theory and Practice, 122 U. PA. L. REV.
810, 830-32 (1974).
3. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181 (1976) (juries are "a significant and
reliable objective index of contemporary values"); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S.
510, 519 n. 15 (1968) ("one of the most important functions any jury can perform [in
imposing criminal liability] is to maintain a link between contemporary community
values and the penal system").
4.. See FED. R. Clv. P.. 12, 50(a), 56.
5. See FED. R. Civ. P. 51.
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jury's verdict in post-trial motions and appeals. 6 The greater
the control, the smaller the risk that jury majorities will stymie
the countermajoritarian purposes of constitutional rights.
The purpose of this article is to describe two developments
which have reduced the role juries play in civil constitutional
cases. Neither of these developments result from a direct attempt to counter the majoritarian tendencies of juries. Instead, they are rooted in the United States Supreme Court's
inability to reduce constitutional law to coherent rules which
officials can be expected to understand and juries can be expected to apply. First, the Supreme Court has expanded the
immunity of governmental officials from the burdens of trial in
situations in which their conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right. 7 Because such immunity is properly
enforceable by the court prior to trial, fewer constitutional
cases reach the jury. Second, the Supreme Court has re-evaluated the distinction between questions of law and questions of
fact in constitutional cases.8 Where a constitutional standard
can be given its proper meaning only when properly applied,
the Supreme Court has indicated that a jury's application of
such standards to undisputed facts can be second-guessed by
judges.
The vast majority of lawsuits raising constitutional questions
are filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 9 Accordingly, this article will focus upon section 1983 litigation, while recognizing
that constitutional litigation in other contexts has influenced
the manner in which courts perceive the jury's role in section
1983 cases. 10
6. See FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b), 52(a); See generally FED. R. APP. P. 1-48.
7. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
8. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of -United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485,
499-500 (1984); Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 (1985).
9. Section 1983 of title 42 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custorn, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party in an action at law, suit in equity or other proper proceeding for
redress.
This provision originated from section 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27,
and wasre-enacted as section 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13.
10. The doctrine of independent review of constitutional facts predates the
Supreme Court's rediscovery of section 1983 in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961). Thus, many of the most important decisions involving the jury's role in con-
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ROLE OF JURY

QUALIFIED IMMUNITY: FROM QUESTION OF FACT TO
QUESTION OF LAW

A common issue in most constitutional cases is whether individual government officials sued in their personal capacities
are immune from liability. In 1982 the Supreme Court reassessed the qualified immunity given to executive officials, and
found that immunity should protect government officials from
insubstantial lawsuits and not simply from liability."t It therefore modified its previous standard, which had included an inherent jury question, in order to provide a test which it hoped
could be applied prior to trial. As subsequent cases have
demonstrated, qualified immunity is now generally considered
a question of law, 12 which usually can be resolved without any
assistance (or interference) from a jury.
On its face, section 1983 does not provide that any government officials will be immune from liability. However, the
Supreme Court has recognized immunities .from section 1983
liability which have no source in the statute's text or legislative
history. 13 The Court's original justification for such immunistitutional cases arose in other contexts, such as judicial review of criminal convictions involving protected activity, Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 385-87 (1927);
convictions violative of equal protection, Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 589-90
(1935); and civil proceedings impacting upon the defendant's constitutional rights,
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284-86 (1964).
11. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 814-18. Municipal officials can become embroiled in litigation, despite their personal immunity, if the plaintiff seeks prospective
relief or can state a claim against the municipality itself. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650 (1980) (municipality not entitled to official's good faith
immunity). To properly plead a section 1983 claim against a municipality, a plaintiff
must allege that his constitutional rights were violated as a result of an official custom
or policy of the municipality. Owen, 445 U.S. at 633, 657. While such allegations are
commonly pleaded, they seldom survive pre-trial motions in the absence of an express unconstitutional policy, or evidence of deliberate indifference by the municipality's final decision makers to a known pattern of unconstitutional conduct. See, e.g.,
Herrera v. Valentine, 653 F.2d 1220, 1224-25 (8th Cir. 1981).
12. See, e.g., Warren.v. City of Lincoln, 816 F.2d 1254, 1261-62 (8th Cir. 1987),
rev'd on other grounds, 864 F.2d 1436 (8th Cir. 1989) (en banc); McIntosh v. Weinberger, 810 F.2d 1411, 1432 n.8 (8th Cir. 1987), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Turner v. McIntosh, 487 U.S. 1212 (1988). But see Hartley v. Fine, 780 F.2d 1383,
1386-87 (8th Cir. 1986) (Eighth Circuit notes, without criticism, that district court
submitted the issue of qualified immunity to the jury). Somewhat different approaches to this issue are presented in Brady v. Gebbie, 859 F.2d 1543, 1556 (9th
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 1577 (1989); Brisk v. City of Miami Beach, 726 F.
Supp. 1305, 1309-15 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
13. See, e.g., Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (legislative immunity);
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (judicial immunity); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416
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ties rested upon the questionable premise that the Reconstruction Congresses which created section 1983 must have
intended to permit such immunities, at least to the extent they
were available to defendants under the common law of that
era. 14
The Supreme Court has occasionally strayed from that original justification, and has crafted certain immunities in order to
advance policy objectives which the Reconstruction Congresses and the nineteenth-century common-law courts may
never have actually considered.' 5 The qualified immunity
given to executive officials has not been shaped by reference to
nineteenth-century common law, but only by reference to
twentieth-century concerns.
Executive immunity is "qualified" in the sense that its availability depends upon certain special circumstances which can
exist at one moment and not the next. Between the Supreme
Court's 1975 decision in Wood v. Strickland 16 and its 1982 decision in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,'7 two circumstances were necessary
before executive officials performing discretionary functions
would be immune. Such officials were required to demonstrate that they acted in subjective good faith (without a "malicious intention") and were further required to show that the
right alleged to have been violated was not a "clearly established' right at the time of the alleged violation.' 8 Lower
courts soon recognized that the subjective prong of this test
involved a question of fact. 19 As with many subjective issues,
plaintiffs could easily controvert the official's good faith and
the issue was seldom resolved prior to trial. Thus, qualified
U.S. 232 (1974) (executive. officials' immunity); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409
(1976) (prosecutorial immunity).
14. Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376. For a sophisticated critique of the Court's application of the doctrine, see generally Matasar, PersonalImmunities Under Section 1983: The
Limits of the Court's HistoricalAnalysis, 40 ARK. L. REV. 741 (1987).
15. 457 U.S. at 815-20; see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 645 (1987)
(admitting that in Harlow, the Supreme Court had "completely reformulated qualified immunity along principles not at all embodied in the common law.").
16. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
17. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
18. See, e.g, Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975) (in context of school
discipline action, school board member not liable under section 1983 unless member
"has acted with an impermissible motivation or with .. .disregard of the student's
clearly established constitutional rights").
19. See, e.g., Landrum v. Moats, 576 F.2d 1320, 1329 (8th Cir. 1978).
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immunity rarely protected government officials from the burdens of trial.
In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court found that this
two-part approach permitted too many "insubstantial claims"
to distract public officials.2 0 Accordingly, it eliminated the subjective prong altogether. A key premise for this decision was
the Court's belief that qualified immunity should not simply
protect government officials from ultimate liability, but should
protect them from unwarranted trials, and if possible, discovery prior to such trials. 2' Under the Harlow standard, "government officials performing discretionary functions generally are
shielded from liability for civil damages in so far as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
22
known."

The Supreme Court hoped that the modified immunity standard could be applied prior to-trial, on a motion to dismiss or a
motion for summary judgment. 23 When a claim is legally "insubstantial" and not simply factually insubstantial, the Harlow
standard has generally worked as intended. It has permitted
courts to dismiss novel claims against government officials
prior to trial which previously would have gone to trial because
the plaintiff would have controverted the defendant's subjective good faith. 4
However, the Harlow standard has been less successful in
protecting government officials from litigating factually insubstantial claims. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have
been construed to require courts considering motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment to assume the plaintiff can prove all pleaded or properly controverted facts.2 5 The
Harlow Court simply directed courts to adopt a "firm applica20. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816-17.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 818.
23. Id. See also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
24. See, e.g., Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1453-54 (8th Cir. 1987).
25. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) ("[A] complaint should not
be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."); Union Nat'l Bank v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 860 F.2d 847, 854 (8th Cir.
1988) (Summary judgment is inappropriate where the evidence presents "conflicting
rationally possible conclusions.").
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tion of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. '2 6 A right may be
clearly established in the context pled or properly controverted by the plaintiff, but may be novel in the context which is
ultimately established at trial.2 7 In such cases a court cannot
remain faithful to both the expectations of the Harlow Court
and the Federal Rules.
In 1987 the Supreme Court reinterpreted the Harlow standard in a manner which made it more difficult for section 1983
plaintiffs to survive a pretrial motion. In Creighton v. City of St.
Paul, plaintiffs alleged they were the victims of an unreasonable
search after local police and at least one FBI agent entered and
searched their home without a warrant in the mistaken belief a
fugitive might be found there.2 8 In U.S. district court, summary judgment was granted, resulting in dismissal of plaintiffs'
fourth amendment action against the FBI agent. The court
ruled that the agent was entitled to qualified immunity under
Harlow because the warrantless search of the home was
reasonable.2 9
The Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that the issue of the
lawfulness of the search could not be properly decided on
summary judgment.3 0 The court also held that the agent was
not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity
grounds. The court noted that the fourth amendment rights at
issue (i.e., the validity of warrantless searches where elements
of probable cause and exigent circumstances are present) were
clearly established rights. 3 ' The Eighth Circuit refused to con26. 457 U.S. at 819-20 n.35 (citation omitted).
27. The most notable examples are cases in which "clearly established law makes
the conduct legal or illegal depending upon the intent with which it is performed."
Halperin v. Kissinger, 807 F.2d 180, 184 (D.C. Cir. 1986). "Because [in Harlow] the
Court did not thereby purge substantive constitutional doctrine of all subjective issues, it did not entirely eliminate subjective inquiry from every qualified immunity
analysis." Kenyatta v. Moore, 744 F.2d 1179, 1185 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1066 (1985). As the Eighth Circuit has recognized, "motivation is frequently an
issue going to the heart of some lawsuits against public officials, such as civil-rights or
First Amendment actions, and that many cases will present factual questions of motivation incapable of resolution on summary judgment." Wright v. South Ark. Regional Health Center, Inc., 800 F.2d 199, 205 (8th Cir. 1986) (concluding "this is not
such a case"). See generally Balcerzak, Qualified Immunity for Government Officials: The
Problemof UnconstitutionalPurpose in Civil Rights Litigation, 95 YALE L.J. 126, 127 (1975).
28. Creighton v. City of St. Paul, 766 F.2d 1269, 1270-71 (8th Cir. 1985), rev'd
sub nom. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
29. See Creighton, 766 F.2d at 1271.
30. See id. at 1273-75.
31. Id. at 1277. Judge MacLaughlin adopted a similar approach to qualified im-
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sider whether those rights had or had not been respected in
the circumstances with which the officer was confronted at the
time. The court proclaimed that these were questions properly to be decided by the jury on remand. 2
In reversing the Eighth Circuit, the Supreme Court recognized that many constitutional rights are meaningful only in a
factual context. Writing for the Court in Anderson v. Creighton,
Justice Scalia noted that every constitutional right is clearly established at a very high level of generality.33 The Justice then
added:
But if the test of "clearly established law" were to be applied at this level of generality, it would bear no relationship
to the "objective legal reasonableness" that is the touchstone of Harlow. Plaintiff would be able to convert the rule
of qualified immunity that our cases plainly establish into a
rule of virtually unqualified liability simply by alleging violation of extremely abstract rights.3 4
Justice Scalia clarified the proper interpretation of the term
"clearly established," holding that "the right the official is alleged to have violated must have been 'clearly established' in a
more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable
official would understand that what he is doing violates that
right."'3 5
For government officials, Anderson provides both a blessing
and a curse. The decision precludes plaintiffs from using artful
pleading to deprive government officials of their immunity.
However, by forcing courts to consider immunity in a factual
context, the Anderson decision redirects trial courts to questions
of fact not necessarily resolvable prior to trial.
munity in his first order in the massive "Scott County Cases," stating "[p]laintiffs
assert that they were arrested without probable cause, and this right is beyond question." Thus, dismissal on qualified immunity grounds was precluded. See In re Scott
County Master Docket, 618 F. Supp. 1534, 1550 (D. Minn. 1985), rev'd, Myers v.
Morris, 810 F.2d 1437 (8th Cir. 1987).
32. See Creighton, 766 F.2d at 1275-77.
33. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638-39 (1987).
34. Id. at 639. Justice Scalia's analysis is strikingly similar to the approach taken
by the Eighth Circuit several months earlier in reversing Judge MacLaughlin's initial
approach to qualified immunity. See Myers, 810 F.2d at 1459 n.16.
35. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640. On remand, the district court granted Anderson's

motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, reasoning that Anderson could reasonably have concluded that probable cause and exigent circumstances existed. Creighton v. Anderson, 724 F. Supp. 654, 660-61 (D. Minn. 1989).
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The Eighth Circuit has developed a two-step approach to applying the Anderson test. First, the trial court must determine
whether the law prohibiting the alleged conduct was clearly established at the time it occurred. If not, the official is immune,
and no further analysis is necessary.3 6 According to the Eighth
Circuit, for the second step
a trial court must determine whether the conduct, as alleged
by the plaintiff, constituted actions that a reasonable officer
could have believed lawful. If so, the defendant is entitled
to dismissal prior to discovery. If not, and the parties disagree
as to what actions the police officers took, then discovery may be
necessary before the defendant's motion on qualified immunity can be resolved.3 7

In Ginter v. Stallcup, the Eighth Circuit emphasized that
discovery should occur on the issue of qualified immunity
only if the parties disagree as to what actions the law enforcement officers took and ifthe plaintiff can present some evidence to support her allegations. Mere allegations, without
more, do 8not create a question of fact as to qualified
immunity.3
Thus, the court can resolve the question of immunity prior to
discovery and trial unless the parties present conflicting evidence on a fact upon which a violation of a clearly established
3
constitutional right depends. 1
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has taken an additional step designed to permit sum36. See Ginter v. Stallcup, 869 F.2d 384, 387 (8th Cir. 1989).
37. Id. at 387-88 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals, among others, has ruled that the second step of analysis constitutes a
question for thejury. See Brady v. Gebbie, 859 F.2d 1543, 1556 (9th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 1577 (1989) ("Whether a reasonable official would know that she is
violating that clearly established law is a question for the jury."). See also Melear v.
Spears, 862 F.2d 1177, 1184 (5th Cir. 1989); Brisk v. City of Miami Beach, 726 F.
Supp. 1305, 1309-15 (S.D. Fla. 1989). Instead of submitting special interrogatories
on disputed details material to the court's resolution of this question, these courts
would submit the ultimate issue of immunity to the jury and use "appropriate instructions" to guard against confusion. See Brisk at 1314-15. Such an approach would
make it easier for section 1983 plaintiffs to frustrate an early resolution of the immunity question. A plaintiff could use vague pleading to survive the first step of the
analysis, and survive the second step by showing that reasonable jurors could differ
about what a reasonable official would know.
38. Ginter v. Stallcup, 869 F.2d at 388 (emphasis added).
39. See, e.g., Poe v. Haydon, 853 F.2d 418, 426 (6th Cir. 1988) ("[S]ummaryjudgment would not be appropriate if there is a factual dispute.., involving an issue on
which the question of immunity turns, such that it cannot be determined before trial
whether the defendant did acts that violate clearly established rights.").
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mary judgment of certain factually insubstantial lawsuits
against officials. In Martin v. D.C. Metropolitan Police Dep't., a
plaintiff alleged that an otherwise constitutional arrest was unconstitutional because it was motivated by a desire to deter
him from vindicating his rights. 40 The court held that while
the issue of subjective motivation was, in some contexts, still
relevant after Harlow,'4 1 direct evidence of unconstitutional motive would be necessary if the case was to proceed to trial."2
Otherwise, the purposes of qualified immunity would be
frustrated.
The "direct evidence" requirement is unlikely to catch on
without the Supreme Court's endorsement. That Court has
acknowledged the difficulties of proving that governmental
conduct was motivated by a discriminatory intent.43 In an era
in which public admissions of racism and sexism are rare, section 1983 plaintiffs frequently have little choice but to rely
upon inferences from circumstantial evidence to prove wrongful motivation. Under Martin, however, such cases would be
deemed too "insubstantial" to proceed to trial. It is worth recalling that one of section 1983's original purposes was to provide an effective remedy for victims of racial discrimination by
state and local officials. It would be ironic indeed if one of the
solutions federal courts adopt to prevent abuses of section
1983 frustrates that purpose, while permitting section 1983
claims the Reconstruction Congresses never conceived of to
proceed to trial.
40. 812 F.2d 1425, 1427 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The plaintiff was allegedly assaulted
by law enforcement officers during a public demonstration. Subsequent to the assault, the plaintiff was arrested and charged with certain crimes. The plaintiff alleged
that the purpose behind these charges was to deter him from asserting any legal
rights he might have with respect to the assault. See id.
41. See id. at 1431-32.
42. Id. at 1435. See also Poe, 853 F.2d at 432 (adopting Martin's "direct evidence"
requirement in section 1983 gender discrimination action).
43. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 266 (1977) ("Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a
motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available."); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976)
("Necessarily, an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the
totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears more
heavily on one race than another.").
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THE INCREASING DOMINANCE OF QUESTIONS OF LAW IN
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

In the most simple case, the jury's role is easily understood.
The jury is permitted to render a general verdict as long as the
evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact.4 4 The jury's
general verdict will ordinarily stand as long as the court provided the jury with a correct statement of governing law in its
instruction, and any reasonable trier of fact could have reached
the same verdict.4 5
Two complications arise in constitutional litigation with
some frequency. These complications make it difficult to use
general verdicts and narrow standards of review without compromising the values protected by the Constitution.
The first complication arises from the inherent conflict between constitutional values and jury tendencies. Constitutional rights are commonly countermajoritarian; they exist in
46
order to limit the power of popularly elected government.
Because jurors are usually selected from the same pool of voters which elect state and local officials, a danger exists that they
will abuse their discretion to see that the government's ends
are served.4 7
The Supreme Court is reluctant to presume that any part of
the judicial system is prone to bias. 48 However, on occasion
the Court has been sensitive to this tension. In Monitor Patriot
v. Roy, 4 9 the Supreme Court restricted the jury's authority in a
libel case to determine the relevance of a defamatory statement
to the plaintiff's status as a public figure. The Court explained
that the jury's application of such a standard "is unlikely to be
44. In the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, motions may be made for
summary judgment or directed verdict. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56, 50(a).
45. See FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b).
46. See sources cited supra note 2.
47. See Lawton v. Nightingale, 345 F. Supp. 683, 684 (N.D. Ohio 1972) (Permitting jury trial in section 1983 case would produce "the very evil the statute is
designed to prevent .. .the person seeking to vindicate an unpopular right would
never succeed before a jury drawn from a populace mainly opposed to his views.").
As a basis for denying a trial by jury, this rationale did not survive the Supreme
Court's decision in Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974). See Hildebrand v. Board
of Trustees of Mich. State Univ., 607 F.2d 705, 707 (6th Cir. 1979).
48. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297 (1987) ("exceptionally clear
proof" is necessary before the court will infer that a jury abused its discretion in
treating murderers of white victims more harshly than murderers of black victims at
the death penalty stage).
49. 401 U.S. 265 (1971).
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neutral with respect to the content of speech and holds a real
danger of becoming an instrument for the suppression of
those 'vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks' which must be protected if the guarantees of the First
50
and Fourteenth Amendments are to prevail."
Similarly, jurors' local interests may conflict with national
interests protected by the Constitution. A state which regulates commerce in order to protect local industries and businesses may violate the dormant commerce clause 5 ' if the
protections afforded by the regulation come at the expense of
out-of-state industry. 52 A jury drawn from the population of
the regulating state, and empaneled to decide an underlying
fact issue in commerce clause litigation, may have no interest
in frustrating such protectionism.
The second complication arises from the impossibility of adequately capturing the full meaning of many constitutional
principles injury instructions. On rare occasions, the Supreme
Court reduces its constitutional analysis to a coherent rule
which a jury can be trusted to apply.53 With increasing frequency, however, the Court has been unable or unwilling to
settle on a rule. Instead, it has chosen to adopt a case-by-case
approach or a mode of analysis which is meaningful only in its
application to a specific context. 54 In theory, it may be possible to quote the Court's test in an instruction and hope that
the jury's application of it will reflect the interests and values
which the Supreme Court had in mind. In practice, however,
something will be lost in the translation.
50. Id. at 277 (citation omitted).
51. When a state enacts regulations governing an aspect of commerce, those regulations may conflict with Congress' power under the commerce clause in article I,
section 8, clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution. This conflict may occur even if Congress
has enacted no regulations of its own in the particular area of commerce. The "dormant commerce clause" is a reference to a court's interpretation of congressional
"silence" in an area of commerce. For a discussion, seeJ. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J.
YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 8.1-8.5 (3d ed. 1986).
52. See generally Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
53. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981); United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
54. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (balancing test for
determining how much process is "due"); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 307-10 (1978) ("compelling interest" analysis of affirmative action); Police
Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972) ("content-neutrality" analysis); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569 (1968) (balancing test for employee speech); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (four-part
analysis of justifications for regulating expressive conduct).
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For decades, the Supreme Court's approach to the law-fact
distinction in constitutional cases has been somewhat inconsistent, and certainly incomplete. On several occasions, the
Court simply treated factual findings in constitutional cases in
the same manner as factual findings in non-constitutional
cases. 55 However, in other decisions, the Supreme Court has
abandoned its usual deference to factual findings (usually labeled as "mixed questions of law and fact") in reliance on a
purported obligation to conduct an "independent examination
of the whole record ' 5 6 in order to ensure that the Constitution
has been properly applied.
In 1984 in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. ,58
the Supreme Court attempted to synthesize these two lines of
cases into a coherent doctrine. In Bose, a manufacturer of
unique stereo loudspeakers brought a product disparagement
suit against a leading consumer magazine which had given its
product a mixed review. On appeal from a trial court's judgment in favor of the plaintiff, a critical question was whether
the magazine's reviewer acted with actual malice when he
wrote that the "individual instruments heard through the Bose
system.., tended to wander about the room." 59 The reviewer
had admitted at trial that the instruments merely wandered
along the wall.6" The First Circuit did not defer to the trial
court's finding of actual malice.61 Instead, it performed a "de
novo review, independently examining the record to ensure
that the district court has applied properly the governing constitutional law and that the plaintiff has indeed satisfied its burden of proof."' 62 Unable to find clear and convincing evidence
that the magazine published the statement with knowledge that
55. See, e.g., Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471
U.S. 707, 720-21 (1985); Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 229 (1985); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 256 (Stevens, J., concurring).
56. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963).
57. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 933-34 (1982); New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284-86 (1964); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S.
49, 52 (1949); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 335 (1946); Baumgartner v.
United States, 322 U.S. 665, 670-71 (1944).
58. 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
59. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 1249,
1264 (D.Mass. 1981), cert. granted, 461 U.S. 904 (1983), aft'd, 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
60. Id. at 1276-77.
61. See Bose Corp. v.Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 692 F.2d 189, 195
(1st Cir. 1982).
62. Id.
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it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not, the First Circuit reversed the judgment.
The plaintiff understandably could complain that the court
of appeals had invaded the factfinder's province. The First
Circuit had second-guessed a finding about what the reviewer
actually knew. The factfinder's determination of actual knowledge was based in large part upon an evaluation of the demeanor of the reviewer on the witness stand.63 The court of
appeals' scrutiny seemed inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's prior description of the question of actual malice. In
Herbert v. Lando, the question of actual malice had been described by the Court as a qhestion of "ultimate fact."' If the
finding in Bose could be subjected to de novo review, would
any finding of fact in a constitutional case be safe?
By six-to-three vote, the Supreme Court affirmed the First
Circuit's decision. 65 Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens
acknowledged that "two well-settled and respected rules of law
point in opposite directions."' 66 On the one hand, Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) mandated a "clearly erroneous"
standard of review for findings of fact, and "it surely does not
stretch the language of the Rule to characterize an inquiry into
what a person knew at a given point in time as a question of
'fact.' ",67 However, the rule of independent review, which the
Supreme Court itself had invoked repeatedly in first amendment cases, could not be ignored.
Justice Stevens avoided the obstacle of Rule 52(a) in a familiar manner, by implicitly framing the Court's task as an application of the fact-law distinction.68 His analysis focused upon
three characteristics of the "actual malice" requirement which
made independent review justifiable from a historical and constitutional perspective. 69 First, the "actual malice" requirement was derived from common-law standards which allow the
judge the maximum of power in passingjudgment in a particu63.
64.
65.
(1984).
66.
67.
68.
69.

Bose, 508 F. Supp. at 1276-77.
Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 170 (1979).
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 514
Id. at 498.
Id.
See id. at 501.
Id. at 502-03.
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lar case. 70 Second, "the content of the rule is not revealed simply by its literal text, but rather is given meaning through the
evolutionary process of common-law adjudication." ' 7 1 Justice
Stevens added that the Supreme Court's "role in marking out
the limits of the [actual malice] standard through the process
of case-by-case adjudication is of special importance.' '72
Third, "the constitutional values protected by the [actual malice] rule make it imperative that judges-and in some cases
judges of this Court-make sure that it is correctly applied."7 3
In explaining these factors,Justice Stevens left no doubt that
his analysis should apply with equal force to jury verdicts. 4
Indeed, the Supreme Court had already exercised independent
review of evidence supporting jury verdicts in cases such as
Fiske v. Kansas,75 New York Times v. Sullivan,76 and Jenkins v. Georgia. 7 Moreover, two of the judges dissenting in Bose viewed
jury verdicts with more suspicion than the findings of a
judge.78
On its face, the holding in Bose and its reasoning were limited to first amendment cases. However, the doctrine of independent review had been applied outside of the first
amendment long before Bose, 79 and it was not apparent why
Justice Stevens's broad justification of independent review
should be limited to a single constitutional amendment.8 0
Moreover, the Court's extension of independent review to a
state-of-mind issue raised concerns that verdicts on similar issues-such as discriminatory intent-would now be subject to
de novo review.
70. See id. at 502.

71. Id. at 502.
72. Id. at 503.
73. Id. at 502.
74. Id. at 501 ("[T]he rule of independent review assigns to judges a constitutional responsibility that cannot be delegated to the trier of fact, whether the factfinding function can be performed in the particular case by a jury or by a trial judge.").
75. 274 U.S. 380, 385 (1927) (involving a criminal conviction for union activity).
76. 376 U.S. 254, 284-86 (1964) (involving a civil defamation action).
77. 418 U.S. 153, 159-61 (1974) (involving a jury verdict that an R-rated movie
was obscene).
78. See Bose, 466 U.S. at 518 n.2 (Rehnquist & O'Connor, JJ., dissenting) ("The
factfinding process engaged in by a jury rendering a general verdict is much less
evident to the naked eye and thus more suspect than the factfinding process engaged
in by a trial judge who makes written findings as here.").
79. See, e.g., Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
80. See Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 264-68

(1985).
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In three subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court has refused to extend its approach in Bose to other treatments of constitutional facts. In Miller v. Fenton, the Supreme Court was
asked to reconsider its previous decisions holding that the voluntariness of a confession is a question of law requiring independent federal determination in habeas corpus cases."'
The Court engaged in a re-examination of the fact-law distinction, adopting a central tenet of Bose while acknowledging limitations on its scope. Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor
(a dissenter in Bose) embraced a key precept of Bose:
Where... the relevant legal principle can be given meaning
only through its application to the particular circumstances
of a case, the Court has been reluctant to give the tiier of
fact's conclusions presumptive force and, in so doing, strip
a federal appellate
court of its primary function as an expos82
itor of law.
However, Justice O'Connor was equally respectful of the value
of deference where "the issue involves the credibility of witnesses and therefore turns largely on an evaluation of demeanor."83 Accordingly, she left no doubt that answers to
"subsidiary questions such as the length and circumstances of
the interrogation," are entitled to a presumption of correctness on review. 814
The Court, relying on three propositions, treated the ultimate issue of voluntariness as a question of law. First, the
Court reasoned that voluntariness analysis required an evaluation of whether the techniques used to extract the confession
were compatible with due process values.8 5 Second, the Court
noted that "assessments of credibility and demeanor [were]
not crucial" to the resolution of the voluntariness issue.8 6 Finally, "independent federal review has traditionally played an
important parallel role in protecting the rights at stake."8 "
In Maine v. Taylor,8 a dormant commerce clause case, the
Supreme Court reversed a decision of the First Circuit, which
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 (1985).
Id. at 114 (citing Bose, 466 U.S. at 503).
Id.
Id. at 117.
Id. at 116.
Id. at 116-17.
Id. at 117-18.
477 U.S. 131, 144-45 (1986).
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had conducted an independent review of the trial court's finding that a less discriminatory alternative to the state regulation
was not available. With only a passing reference to Bose, the
Supreme Court stated in broad terms that "appellate courts
are not to decide factual questions de novo, reversing any findings they would have made differently."-8 9 Because the Court
viewed the availability of alternative means as an empirical
question, it had little difficulty explaining its reversal. 90
More recently, the Supreme Court considered the proper
application of Bose following a jury trial, where proof of actual
malice was heavily dependent upon credibility determinations.
In Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton,9 1 the Court
preserved the trier of fact's discretion to evaluate the credibility of witnesses and resolve subsidiary factual disputes. Justice
Stevens, again writing for the majority, denied that the Bose de92
cision authorized an invasion of the trier of fact's province.
While the jury's credibility determinations would be entitled to
deference, the ultimate finding of actual malice remained subject to independent review.93
Unfortunately, however, the case was not submitted to the
jury in a matter designed to facilitate this mixture of deference
and independent review. The jury was asked to reach a verdict
on the ultimate issue of actual malice, and was not asked to
answer any special interrogatories concerning any of the "subsidiary facts" or the credibility of testimony.9 4 However, the
Supreme Court deduced from the jury's response and the undisputed evidence that the jury must have rejected the only testimony controverting actual malice.95
These decisions reflect a division of labor in constitutional
cases which is easy to defend but difficult to apply. The reviewing court must now scrutinize the record closely enough to ensure that the trier of fact has given the proper meaning to the
constitutional standards involved. 96 In so doing, however, it
must not judge the credibility of witnesses and cannot second89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id.
Id.
109 S. Ct. 2678 (1989).
Id. at 2696 n.35.
Id. at 2695.
Id. at 2682 n.2.
Id. at 2697.
Bose, 466 U.S. at 505.
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guess findings of so-called subsidiary facts. 9 7
Under a careful application of Bose, the role of the jury will
be limited to deciding "what happened, ' 98 if a genuine dispute
exists about what happened and a resolution of that dispute is
material to the outcome of the case. For example, in a case
involving the presence of probable cause for an arrest, a trial
may be necessary to decide which witnesses' description of circumstances leading to the arrest is accurate. However, under
Bose, the evaluation of those circumstances to determine
whether they provided the officer with a sufficient justification
for the arrest should not be left to thejury. Such an evaluation
is the process through which the constitutional standard of
probable cause is given meaning.99
The Supreme Court and the Eighth Circuit appear to have
adopted this approach. In New Jersey v. T.L.0., the Supreme
Court reviewed a state court's ruling that a teacher lacked reasonable grounds to search a student's purse for cigarettes.' 0 0
The Supreme Court recognized that the "reasonable grounds"
standard applied by the state court was not substantially different from the proper standard.' 0 ' However, its own review of
the facts surrounding the search led the0 2Supreme Court to
conclude that the search was reasonable.
In Warren v. City of Lincoln, the Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc,
reviewed a section 1983 claim brought by an attempted burglary suspect against three police officers and the municipality
which employed them. 0 3 At trial, two of the officers testified
that they believed they lacked probable cause to arrest the
plaintiff for attempted burglary, but persuaded the jury to find
in their favor nevertheless. 1°4 The majority of the Eighth Circuit's judges concluded that probable cause not only existed
97. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 117 (1985).
98. Cf. Monaghan, supra note 80, at 235.
99. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1982) (in criminal investigation context,
magistrate applies constitutional standards to totality of the circumstances in order to
determine existence of probable cause necessary for issuance of search warrant). See
also Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 51 (1949) ([T]he term " 'issue of fact' ... does not
cover a conclusion drawn from uncontroverted happenings, when that conclusion
incorporates standards of conduct or criteria for judgment which in themselves are
decisive of constitutional rights.").
100. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1982).
101. Id. at 343.
102. Id.
103. Warren v. City of Lincoln, 864 F.2d 1436, 1437 (8th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
104. Id. at 1439.
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but existed as a matter of law. Rejecting the arguments of four
dissenting judges who insisted that a jury must decide whether
probable cause existed, the majority reviewed the uncontroverted facts which were within the offiters' knowledge, compared those facts to other cases in which probable cause
existed, and affirmed the judgment. 105
In an excessive force case, a similar application of Bose would
limit the jury's province to a resolution of any dispute concerning the circumstances in which force was used. An evaluation
of whether the force used was too much force under those circumstances arguably should be decided by the court.' 0 6 However, this approach is hardly popular. Many courts continue to
permit juries to decide whether force was constitutionally ex0 7
cessive, and reverse judges who interfere with that decision.1
In other section 1983 cases, there are relatively few material
underlying facts. Where the constitutionality of a law or regulation depends upon the adequacy of the government's justification, for example, the credibility of witnesses is largely
beside the point.10 Thus, in cases involving the constitutionality of local sign ordinances, reviewing courts have shown no
deference to the trial court's conclusion that the ordinance directly advances the city's interest, and is not more extensive
than necessary.t°9
In the area of prisoners' rights, the Supreme Court has now
required courts to focus almost exclusively on the government's justification for its conduct, without reaching the empirical question of whether a less restrictive means was in fact
105. Id. at 1440-42.
106. As Professor Nahmod recently noted, "[olne result of this movement toward
'objectiveness' is that with respect to excessive force and qualified immunity issues,
the role of the jury has been considerably diminished, if not altogether eliminated."
S. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHrs AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF § 1983,
§ 3.04, p. 8 0 (2d ed. Supp. 1989).
107. See, e.g., Powell v. Gardner, 891 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2d Cir. 1989) (Jury should
be instructed that it could find in favor of plaintiff if it believed his testimony and if it
was persuaded that the conduct of defendant was not objectively reasonable in light
of the facts and circumstances confronting him.). See also Patzner v. Burkett, 779 F.2d
1363, 1371-72 (8th Cir. 1985) ("[T]he alleged use of excessive force is generally an
issue of fact.").
108. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557, 563-66 (1980); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
109. See Lindsay v. City of San Antonio, 821 F.2d 1103, 1107-09 (5th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1010 (1988); Don's Porta Signs, Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 829
F.2d 1051, 1053 n.9 (Ilth Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 981 (1988).
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available. In its 1987 decision in Safley v. Turner, the Court appeared to reduce the constitutional rights of prisoners down to
a single rule: prison regulations infringing on inmates' constitutional rights are valid if reasonably related to legitimate penological interests."t 0 As the Court demonstrated in Safley,
government officials can satisfy this step by drawing a logical
connection for the court, whether or not that connection is
well-grounded in fact. ' Because the Safley officials' explanation
for an inter-prison correspondence regulation was satisfactory,
the Court did not inquire further. In such cases a jury seems
largely unnecessary.
The Supreme Court's commitment to the principles set forth
in Bose will be severely tested when a section 1983 plaintiff asks
for independent review of a verdict -on the issue of unconstitutional motivation. Prior to Bose, the Supreme Court firmly reversed the Fifth Circuit's longstanding practice of
independently reviewing findings of discriminatory intent in
Title VII cases."l 2 One year after Bose, it unanimously reaffirmed this position, without a single reference to Bose., 3 Its
ruling in Pullman-Standardv. Swint was based in part upon the
Supreme Court's use of a "clearly erroneous" standard of review on the issue of intentional segregation in the 1979 decision in Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman." 4 In each case,
however, the Court did little more than label questions of intent as "pure questions of fact"-an approach which should
have compelled a different result in Bose.
Independent review of the record where racial discrimination is-alleged is hardly new; the Supreme Court exercised it in
Norris v. Alabama to reverse a conviction in the notorious
"Scottsboro Boys" case." 5 Indeed, the risk of majoritarian
bias makes routine deference to a jury's verdict on this issue
110. 428 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). Thejudges of the Eighth Circuit have been engaging
in an on-going battle over the degree of deference which should be given to the trial
court's findings in prisoner Section 1983 actions. Compare Hill v. Blackwell, 774 F.2d
338, 343 (8th Cir. 1985) ("[T]he ultimate conclusion as to constitutionality is a question of law.") with Goffv. Nix, 809 F.2d 530, 531 (8th Cir. 1987) (Lay, J.,dissenting)
("Selective reliance on Anderson v. City of Bessemer City converts the clearly erroneous
rule into a doctrine of convenience for the reviewing court.").
111. Safley, 428 U.S. at 93-95 n.*.
112. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 291-93 (1982).
113. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 571-81 (1985).
114. 433 U.S. 406, 416 (1977).
115. Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 589-90 (1935).
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especially difficult to defend. While credibility determinations
can play an important role in discrimination cases, they are no
more important than in cases such as Bose involving actual
malice.
The most significant difference between actual malice and
discriminatory intent lies in the ease with which the constitutional standard can be captured in a rule. While the full meaning of actual malice has developed on an ad hoc basis through
its application in various contexts, the notion of intentional
discrimination has not. At most, the Supreme Court has enumerated the kinds of evidence which can or cannot support an
inference of discriminatory motive." t 6 Such guidance can be
more easily provided to a jury.
CONCLUSION

It is easy to overstate the significance of whether a judge or
jury wields primary authority in constitutional litigation.
Judges, like jurors, can be prone to localism, and may reflect
the same biases and prejudices as the jury pool. A judge's
sense of how much force is too much force, or what a reasonable police officer would know about citizens' rights, is as likely
to reflect his or her own background as it is to result from a
scholarly interpretation of what the Constitution means.
The greatest benefits of a diminished jury role are subtle,
but important. Absent a settlement, only a judge can bring a
case to an end prior to the close of evidence. As the Supreme
Court recognized in Harlow, public officials should be protected from the burdens of trial (and discovery, if possible) on
insubstantial claims. A proper application of Harlow and Bose
should permit judges to reach the merits and immunity defenses in many constitutional cases at an earlier stage, so long
as no genuine disputes exist about what happened.
The Bose decision should also make the Constitution less
mysterious to officials whose responsibilities require them to
anticipate how it will be enforced. A judge can apply a constitutional standard by comparing the case before him to previous cases. Officials can thus anticipate how a court might rule
by looking for factually analogous cases prior to taking action.
116. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S: 252, 266 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
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Any issues which may arise about the constitutionality of such
actions can then be resolved by reference to the same
decisions.
However, such arguments by analogy cannot be made to a
jury. Because jurors cannot know how the standard was applied in other cases, the same standard can be applied in identical cases with opposite results. The shrinking role of the jury
diminishes the risk that the Constitution will be applied in contradictory or inconsistent ways, by placing the task in the hands
of ajudge. As constitutional application becomes more consistent, it will become more predictable, and fewer violations
should occur.
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